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I. Introduction
We are here today to celebrate, and criticize, the Restatement (Third)
of Restitution & Unjust Enrichment (R3RUE), the product of more than ten
years’ work by its great reporter, Andrew Kull, assisted by a gilt-edged
group of advisors and a serious and hard-working Members’ Consultative
Group. The product of this work is more than just a worthy successor to the
1937 Restatement of Restitution, which created and has shaped the subject
for nearly seventy-five years. Besides Professor Kull’s careful delineation
of the specifics of modern restitution law, his drafts continue to give us an
opportunity to consider the scope and rationale for restitution. We wish to

∗ Peter Linzer is a professor of law at the University of Houston Law Center. He
can be reached at PLinzer@uh.edu.
∗∗ Donna Huffman is a practicing attorney in Oskaloosa, Kansas. She can be reached
at DHuffmanLaw@aol.com.
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examine restitution’s scope, and after examining how it has already been
used, to apply an aggressive use of it to the current mortgage crisis.
II. The Scope of Restitution
The scope of restitution has always been a topic of interest and
controversy, and our friend, Professor Doug Rendleman, one of the most
perceptive observers of remedies in general and restitution in particular, and
the catalyst of this conference, has written at least three important articles
touching on the question of scope: When Is Enrichment Unjust? Restitution
Visits an Onyx Bathroom,1 Quantum Meruit for the Subcontractor: Has
Restitution Jumped Off Dawson’s Dock,2 and Common Law Restitution in
the Mississippi Tobacco Settlement: Did the Smoke Get In Their Eyes?3
We would like to use his thinking as a jumping off point, a metaphor that he
will surely think apt in light of his reference to Dawson’s Dock.
Professor Rendleman discusses "broad" and "narrow" restitution,4
broad restitution being an unbounded system based on fairness, supported
by Lord Mansfield5 and modern giants such as George Palmer,6 Goff and
Jones,7 and Dan Dobbs,8 while narrow restitution requires in Doug’s
quotation from John P. Dawson, "‘some specific ground’ for restitution,
like ‘fraud, mistake, compulsion, undue influence, impossibility or
frustration, sometimes substantial breach, and certain kinds of illegality.’"9
1. Doug Rendleman, When is Enrichment Unjust? Restitution Visits an Onyx
Bathroom, 36 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 991 (2002–2003) [hereinafter Rendleman, Onyx
Bathroom].
2. Doug Rendleman, Quantum Meruit for the Subcontractor: Has Restitution
Jumped Off Dawson’s Dock?, 79 TEX. L. REV. 2055 (2001) [hereinafter Rendleman,
Dawson’s Dock].
3. Doug Rendleman, Common Law Restitution in the Mississippi Tobacco
Settlement: Did the Smoke Get in Their Eyes?, 33 GA. L. REV. 847 (1999) [hereinafter
Rendleman, Smoke].
4. Rendleman, Onyx Bathroom, supra note 1, at 994–1001. He also speaks of
"freestanding restitution" and "restitution as an alternative remedy for a breach of contract or
tort" in Rendleman, Smoke, supra note 3, at 886, following Douglas Laycock, The Scope and
Significance of Restitution, 67 TEX. L. REV. 1276, 1277 (1999). Rendleman, Dawson’s
Dock, supra note 2, is equally concerned with scope, though it does not use shorthand terms.
5. See infra note 17 and accompanying text.
6. GEORGE E. PALMER, THE LAW OF RESTITUTION §§ 1.1, 1.7 (1978).
7. LORD GOFF OF CHIEVELEY & GARETH JONES, THE LAW OF RESTITUTION 12 (Gareth
Jones ed., 5th ed. 1998).
8. DAN B. DOBBS, LAW OF REMEDIES (2d ed. 1993).
9. Rendleman, Onyx Bathroom, supra note 1, at 998 (quoting JOHN P. DAWSON,
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Narrow restitution has many supporters,10 including, especially in its first
draft, the R3RUE itself.11 The obvious problem with broad restitution is
that it seems boundless, while narrow restitution seems to add little to the
existing substantive law of contract, tort and property.
Professor Rendleman proposes a middle ground: "[A] judge or a jury
ought to emphasize the question: Will granting the plaintiff restitution
undermine a policy of property, contract, tort or substantive law?"12 We do
not think that this is an adequate test, and want to focus on a factor that is
not rejected by the Restatement, but which is certainly minimized: The
impoverishment of the plaintiff.
The addition of the words "unjust enrichment" to the title of the
R3RUE emphasizes the centrality of enrichment, as does the text of
Section 1: "A person who is unjustly enriched at the expense of another is
subject to liability in restitution." 13 A Comment continues, "[r]estitution is
concerned with the receipt of benefits that yield a measurable increase in
the recipient’s wealth."14 The R3RUE does not dismiss impoverishment,15
but it minimizes its importance. We recognize that tort and breach of
contract are common ways of dealing with loss, but we believe that a focus
on unjust impoverishment can reveal fact situations that fall between the
UNJUST ENRICHMENT 117–18 (1951)).
10. See, e.g., Peter Birks, A Letter to America: The New Restatement of Restitution, in
3 GLOBAL JURIST FRONTIERS (2003); Emily Sherwin, Restitution and Equity: An Analysis of
the Principle of Unjust Enrichment, 79 TEX. L. REV. 2083, 2112 (2001).
11. See Peter Linzer, Rough Justice: A Theory of Restitution and Reliance, Contracts
and Torts, 2001 WIS. L. REV. 695, 700–01 [hereinafter Linzer, Rough Justice] (describing
the Discussion Draft of Mar. 31, 2000). The specific language criticized in that article
remains in the Final Draft, but the overall attitude is considerably softened.
12. Rendleman, Onyx Bathroom, supra note 1, at 1002–03.
13. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION & UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 1 (2011).
14. Id. § 1 cmt. d. Contrast the scope section of the abandoned RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF RESTITUTION, drafted by William F. Young. "A person who receives benefit by
reason of an infringement of another person’s interest, or of loss suffered by the other, owes
restitution to him in the manner and amount necessary to prevent unjust enrichment."
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF RESTITUTION § 1 (Tentative Draft No. 1, 1983) (emphasis
added). See Chaim Saiman, Restating Restitution: A Case of Contemporary Common Law
Conceptualism, 52 VILL. L. REV. 487, 493 n.20 (2007).
15. After quoting from LaSalle Nat’l Bank v. Perelman, 82 F. Supp. 2d 278, 294–95
(D. Del. 2000), which had written that "the elements of unjust enrichment are: 1) an
enrichment, 2) an impoverishment, 3) a relation between the enrichment and the
impoverishment, 4) the absence of justification and 5) the absence of a remedy provided by
law," Comment d to Section 1 notes that "[t]he first four elements of this list might make a
plausible definition, though the reference to ‘impoverishment’ is too narrow: there is often
no ‘impoverishment’ other than a violation of the claimant’s rights." This obviously does
not deny that impoverishment may be a factor leading to liability in restitution.
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cracks of other areas of law and deserve remediation, and that often may
show what makes an enrichment unjust.
Whether courts actually use the term "restitution" or manipulate other
concepts beyond their normal shapes,16 we believe that they are really
following Lord Mansfield in his formation of the North Star of restitution in
Moses v. Macferlan17: "In one word, the gist of this kind of action is, that
the defendant, upon the circumstances of the case, is obliged by the ties of
natural justice and equity to refund the money."18 These words, like other
towering phrases, can be characterized as either vapid and platitudinous or
profound and central—or both.19 Because justice and fairness are so central
to law, restitution should have a much broader sway than the wide, but
bounded role given it by this Restatement, and should include loss to the
claimant even without a discernable enrichment of the defendant.
Lon Fuller famously wrote that the "restitution interest" in contract
remedies, "involving a combination of unjust impoverishment with unjust
gain, presents the strongest case for relief,"20 while Grant Gilmore, referring
to restitution and reliance in contract law, quipped that "[t]he two concepts
were, indeed, twins. . . . Both situations could have been dealt with under
either slogan but the legal mind has always preferred multiplication to

16. See Linzer, Rough Justice, supra note 11, at 739 (citing Hoffman v. Red Owl
Stores, 133 N.W.2d 267 (Wis. 1965) and Pop’s Cones, Inc. v. Resorts Int’l Hotels, 704 A.2d
1321 (N.J. App. Div. 1998) as examples of where courts will find contract reliance where
the existence of an actual promise is questionable, but a breach of informal trust in a
developing business relationship was clear). Although both cases applied Section 90 of the
RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS, it can be argued that the reliance was not on promises, but on
the relationships themselves. The foundational writer on relational contract theory is Ian
Macneil. See generally Ian R. Macneil, The Many Futures of Contracts, 47 S. CAL. L. REV.
691 (1974); Ian R. Macneil, Efficient Breach of Contract: Circles in the Sky, 68 VA. L. REV.
947 (1982); William Whitford, Ian Macneil’s Contribution to Contracts Scholarship, 1985
WIS. L. REV. 545. Among authorities speaking of reliance on relationships rather than
promises, see Jay M. Feinman, The Last Promissory Estoppel Article, 61 FORDHAM L. REV.
303 (1992); Wallace K. Lightsey, A Critique of the Promise Model of Contract, 26 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 45 (1984–1985); Peter Linzer, Uncontracts: Context, Contort and the
Relational Approach, 1988 ANN. SURVEY OF AMER. L. 139, 155–66; Joseph William Singer,
The Reliance Interest in Property, 40 STAN. L. REV. 611 (1988). On restitution and implied
contract in nonmarital cohabitation, see RESTATEMENT (THIRD) RESTITUTION & UNJUST
ENRICHMENT § 28 cmt. a (2011).
17. Moses v. Macferlan, (1760) 97 Eng. Rep. 676 (K.B.).
18. Id. at 681.
19. Compare for instance "the pursuit of happiness" in The Declaration of
Independence.
20. Lon L. Fuller & William R. Perdue, Jr., The Reliance Interest in Contract
Damages I, 46 YALE L.J. 52, 56 (1936).
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division."21 In both Williston’s defense of reliance in what became Section
90 of the Restatement of Contracts and in that Section’s revision in the
Restatement (Second),22 the interplay with restitution is equally apparent.
Williston, in fact, went to considerable length to say that restitution, or
as it was then called, quasi-contract, was heavily concerned with the injury
to the plaintiff. During the famous "Johnny and the car" discussion in the
American Law Institute’s debate over Section 88 (later Section 90),
Williston argued that as a matter of contract law, reliance on a promise
required its full performance even if the promisee had only spent half as
much as was promised.23 He contrasted this position by saying that it
would be possible to substitute for that section "a section in the restatement
of quasi-contract that under these circumstances the promisee should be
allowed to cover such a sum as would represent the injury he had
suffered."24 A moment later, he continued "[a]s I said to Mr. Coudert, I
could leave this whole thing to the subject of quasi contracts so that the
promisee under those circumstances, shall never recover on the promise but
he shall recover such an amount as will fairly compensate him for any
injury incurred."25
We will first look at traditional restitution, focusing on unpaid
contractors and the public costs of legal private actions like selling
cigarettes and lead paint. Then we will look at the current crisis in home
ownership—mortgage foreclosures in which there are many questions about
the actions of lenders and their successors in interest.26 These actions often
do benefit lenders, and almost always impoverish people who have invested
their savings in their homes, the equity known to be the bedrock of most
American wealth.27

21. GRANT GILMORE, THE DEATH OF CONTRACT 97 (Ronald Collins ed., 1995).
22. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 90 cmt. a (1979) (noting that
"[r]eliance is also a significant feature in numerous rules in the law of negligence, deceit and
restitution," and that those rules overlap with Section 90 in some cases).
23. 4 A.L.I. Proc. app. 85, 98–99 (1926).
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. See, e.g., U.S. Bank Nat’l Ass’n v. Ibanez, 941 N.E.2d 40, 55 (Mass. 2011)
(affirming the lower court’s finding that plaintiff could not foreclose where it did not hold
the underlying note).
27. Lenders and servicers should be distinguished. Servicers will dramatically
increase profit through a fee schedule and retention of late charges where the lender has sold
the mortgage-backed securities (MBS) to the investor and neither servicer or lender now
have "skin in the game."
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While cases have so far focused on saving the people’s homes from
foreclosure or undoing the foreclosure, in cases where the homeowners
have been injured—through loss of their homes, loss of monies that they
have properly paid, loss of credit, improper fees or costs of litigation,
among others—they should be entitled to compensation. Sometimes tort
will accomplish this, but business torts are not always clear and are often
closer to contract and restitution than tort, which is so heavily based on
personal injury. Flexible use of statutory and common law remedies and
expansion of restitution are all appropriate ways to deal with this
impoverishment of those spurred by the heavy selling and sloppy servicing
of the American dream of home ownership.
The lender—the original party to the contract—is long gone; its
expectancy was realized by the sale of the securitized loan leaving some
successor or servicer to benefit from windfall fees and profits largely in
excess of or established outside the original contract.
Part III looks to awards of restitution when defendants do not appear to
have been enriched, at least not unjustly, but where the plaintiffs have
suffered some loss. Part IV is a background and primer on mortgages. Part
V focuses on the foreclosure crisis.
In his Smoke article, Professor Rendleman imagines a young writer
proposing in 1994 a massive lawsuit by the states against the tobacco
companies, and concludes that she would have been called "dreamy" and
her article "deficient," and the writer would not have received tenure.28 He
spends the rest of the article trying to figure out why, given that starting
point, the tobacco companies settled in 1998 by agreeing to pay at least
$206 billion.29 We believe that the tobacco companies made a smart choice
in not going to trial, despite the enormous cost of the settlement, and we
think that our Parts IV and V raise the same kinds of issues: The law may
not yet guarantee the victims of mortgage foreclosure abuses recoveries that
could total billions, but we believe that it will. Hundreds of thousands, if
not millions of people who have lost their homes and credit or are left in a
state of threatened homelessness when the mortgagees and their deputies
were really at fault, are not in a dream, but a nightmare, and the ties of
natural justice and equity call for a remedy.

28.
29.

See Rendleman, Smoke, supra note 3, at 847.
Id. at 848–933.
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III. Traditional Restitution and Impoverishment
A. The Unpaid Contractor Cases
Let us begin with a line of cases that has caused great consternation in
some restitution circles, the unpaid contractor.30 Typically, a contractor is
hired by a person who becomes judgment-proof and does not pay. The
contractor sues another person, sometimes a stranger to the transaction,
sometimes the intended recipient of a gift, claiming an unjust enrichment.
One of the best-known is Paschall’s, Inc. v. Dozier,31 a Tennessee case
from 1966, in which Mary Best and her son, Ronald, had hired the plaintiff,
Paschall’s, to build an addition to her parents’ bathroom.32 Mrs. Best went
bankrupt without paying Paschall’s and Paschall’s sued the parents only,
claiming a mechanic’s lien and also seeking the value of the labor and
materials furnished.33 The trial court had dismissed both of Paschall’s
claims, and Paschall’s, which had failed to comply with the procedures
governing mechanics’ liens, did not appeal from the dismissal of its claimed
lien.34 Mary and Ronald lived with her parents, but while they were clearly
enriched by having the use of the improved bathroom, that was irrelevant to
the suit against her parents. So here we have Paschall’s, which had done
the work but was unpaid, and Mrs. Best’s parents, who for all we know
didn’t want the new bathroom, except as a gift, and at any rate didn’t
contract for it.
But the court reversed the judgment below and held that the parents
were enriched by the new bathroom. It remanded the cause to determine
"whether or not the defendant [the parents] has been so unjustly enriched at
the detriment of the complainant [Paschall’s] so as to require him [sic] to
30. See Rendleman, Onyx Bathroom, supra note 1. The First Restatement denied all
recovery in restitution to the contractor. See RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION § 110 (1937)
("A person who confers a benefit upon another as the performance of a contract with a third
person is not entitled to restitution from the other merely because of the failure of
performance by the third person.").
31. See Paschall’s, Inc. v. Dozier, 407 S.W.2d 150, 155–56 (Tenn. 1966) (holding
"that where a materialman or subcontractor furnishes labor or materials which benefit the
property of a person with whom there is no privity of contract, an action on quantum meruit
may lie against the landowner to recover the reasonable value of said labor and materials so
furnished"). Paschall’s is the basis of Illustration 13 to Section 25.
32. Id.at 151.
33. Id. at 152.
34. Id. at 151–52. Paschall’s claim was listed in Mary Best’s bankruptcy petition but
the court did not know if it had been discharged. Id. Why Paschall’s did not sue Ronald,
whose age we are not told, is not explained by the court.
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make compensation therefor."35 Apparently, it was prepared to find a
sufficiently unjust enrichment if the parents had not paid Paschall’s
anything and Paschall’s had exhausted its remedies against Mary and
Ronald.36 There is no suggestion that it expected the lower court to find the
value to the parents, as opposed to the loss to Paschall’s of its labor and
materials.
Similarly, in a 1997 North Dakota case, Ruby Hoger’s brother hired
George Opp to drill a well on property owned by the brother, their mother
and Ruby.37 George Opp never got paid, and the brother and mother
conveyed the property to Ruby and her husband, Daniel, who let them live
on the property.38 Though Daniel and Ruby did not live on the property and
claimed that they didn’t need or benefit from the well, the North Dakota
Supreme Court held them both liable.39 Ruby claimed that the well had
little or no value on a rural piece of land, and that she got no benefit out of
it since she didn’t live on the land.40 The court found that "a water well for
domestic use in a rural part of this state will have some value. As the trial
court noted, this value may be intrinsic, but value nonetheless."41 It
appears, however, to have affirmed an award to Opp of what he sued for,
the cost of drilling the well—his loss, not Ruby and Daniel’s gain.42
Computing the restitution damages based on the contractor’s loss can
cut both ways. In Idaho Lumber Co. v. Buck,43 in which a contractor
renovated a former funeral home into a space for "a first class restaurant" at
a cost of $106,000, and was paid $66,000 by the now-insolvent developer,
the court agreed that the owner of the property was liable in restitution for
the increased value of the property,44 but only to the limit of the
contractor’s loss—$40,000, though there was evidence that the increase in
35. Id. at 155–56.
36. Id. at 155.
37. Opp v. Matzke, 559 N.W.2d 837, 839 (N.D. 1997).
38. Id.
39. Id. at 841. The trial court had granted summary judgment against Ruby but not
Daniel because of questions of service, but the Supreme Court found that he had appeared in
the action. Id.
40. Id. at 840.
41. Id.
42. Id. at 838. The court is not totally clear on this point, but this seems correct.
43. See Idaho Lumber Co. v. Buck, 710 P.2d 647, 744 (Idaho Ct. App. 1985) (holding
that "the district court did not err in denying a lien against Buck’s interest in the property").
44. See id. at 655 (relying in part on Paschall’s). But see id. at 661 (Barnett, J.,
dissenting) (arguing that Paschall’s should be limited to transactions in which the defendant
was a family member).
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value was more than that.45 A similar holding was made by the Seventh
Circuit in Midcoast Aviation, Inc. v. General Electric Credit Corp.,46 and
both cases are cited for the proposition that "recovery under § 25 is
invariably measured by the lower of the cost incurred and the value
impaired."47 That seems sensible, but not if the basis of liability is
enrichment. Yes, it is plausible to say that the additional gain is not unjust,
since the contractor would be fully paid, but that is another way of saying
that the unjust portion of an enrichment is the unjust impoverishment.
Orleans Onyx, Inc. v. Buchanan,48 is both interesting and troubling.
There, one Buchanan had contracted to buy an antebellum house in
Louisiana for $430,000 in 1980 dollars.49 The seller, Edward G. Brennan,
had allowed him to make alterations, and Buchanan contracted with
Orleans Onyx to redo three bathrooms in cultured onyx, paying $9,900 in
advance.50 When the work was done, Orleans Onyx billed Buchanan for an
additional $10,291.50, but his check for that amount bounced and he was
later sent to prison on an unrelated fraud charge.51 As a result, Mr. Brennan
lost the sale of his house and had to reoccupy it, with three half-paid-for
onyx bathrooms.52 Orleans Onyx sued Brennan, both to enforce a
materialman’s lien and for unjust enrichment.53 The trial court dismissed
both claims, but in an earlier opinion, Orleans Onyx I,54 the Louisiana Court
of Appeals affirmed the dismissal of the lien, but held that Brennan was
Referring to a previous decision,
liable for unjust enrichment.55
Vandervoort v. Levy,56 the Orleans Onyx I court wrote:
45. Id. at 659.
46. See Midcoast Aviation, Inc., v. General Electric Credit Corp., 907 F.2d 732 (7th
Cir. 1990) (holding that the lower court incorrectly instructed the jury on the measure for
quantum meruit recovery).
47. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION & UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 25 cmt. d
(2011).
48. Orleans Onyx, Inc. v. Buchanan, 472 So. 2d 598, 601 (La. Ct. App. 1985)
[hereinafter Orleans Onyx II] (affirming the trial court).
49. Id. at 598.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. See Orleans Onyx, Inc., v. Buchanan, 428 So. 2d 841, 846 (La. Ct. App. 1983)
[hereinafter Orleans Onyx I] (holding a lien unenforceable).
55. Id.
56. See Vandervoort v. Levy, 396 So. 2d 480, 486 (La. Ct. App. 1981) (affirming the
trial court’s award for work done).
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In Vandervoort, the homeowner benefitted from extra work done by the
architect without their approval. A similar situation exists in this case.
Buchanan [sic] benefits from the installation of the more luxurious
bathrooms than he intended to place in the home. Appellant performed
labor and furnished materials for which he received no compensation. A
connection between the enrichment and the impoverishment was the
failure of the owner to take steps to prevent the harm which he could
57
have or should have foreseen.

The court of appeals remanded the case for an assessment of damages,
and on remand the trial court awarded Orleans Onyx only $5,000, about
half what Buchanan owed it.58 On the second appeal, Brennan argued that
he and his wife did not like the bathrooms, finding them "flashy and
gaudy," and Buchanan’s own interior designer said that the fixtures were
incompatible with the style of the house.59
Brennan also had
counterclaimed for $2,250 for his expenses in preparing the bathrooms for
the new fixtures.60 The trial court had not explained how it reached the
$5,000 figure, saying only that unjust enrichment was an equitable remedy.
The court of appeals affirmed, saying little more: "Although we cannot
determine exactly how the court arrived at the figure of $5,000.00, it seems
to be an equitable and realistic award and we so affirm the judgment."61 It
seems clear that the trial court had cut the baby in half, and that this must
have seemed fair to the court of appeals in light of the fact that the
Brennans were benefitted by getting the use of three new bathrooms, but
were burdened by being stuck with vulgar improvements that didn’t go with
the rest of the house and could only be removed at great cost. Since they
had to bear this mixed blessing, the contractor having to bear a quarter of
his total loss does not seem unjust.
Professor Rendleman built his Onyx Bathroom article on Orleans
Onyx II with some modifications,62 and used the case for an illustration
57. Orleans Onyx I, 428 So. 2d at 845. It is hard to see what the owner did wrong.
The true connection between the enrichment and the impoverishment is simply that Orleans
Onyx had done the work for Brennan’s buyer and when the buyer defaulted, Brennan
received the "benefit" of the onyx bathrooms.
58. Orleans Onyx II, 472 So. 2d at 600–01.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 600. We, of course, know that the question whether unjust enrichment is an
equitable remedy is considerably subtler than the Louisiana courts thought. See
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION & UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 4 (2011) (discussing the
complex origin of restitutionary remedies).
62. Rendleman, Onyx Bathroom, supra note 1, at 1013 (increasing the dollar amounts
into twenty-first century numbers, and adding a fact that the existing bathrooms were in need
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why the result probably should have gone the other way.63 He was
somewhat ambivalent. Applying his test, he asked whether a grant of
restitution would undermine the doctrines of other areas of law, here,
contract and perhaps bankruptcy, arguing that the contractor had assumed
the risk of Buchanan’s inability to pay.64 He noted that if the court had
given the contractor his expenses but not his profit, the loss would be
somewhat shared, while giving it all of the owner’s increased market value,
a greater amount, would equal the owner’s "benefit," despite his possible
dislike for the new bathrooms.65 He suggested that the higher amount was
the "right" answer "under precedent,"66 but that the considerations against
restitution persuaded him more than those for it.67 The considerations
against restitution appear to be both the undermining of contract doctrine by
shifting the risk of loss from Orleans Onyx to a noncontracting party,
Brennan, and imposing a result on Brennan that interferes with his
autonomy.68
This does not get us very far. Professor Rendleman makes clear that
the First Restatement’s absolute ban on contractors recovering from third
parties cannot be defended.69 In fact, he offers his proposal "[i]nstead of the
[First] Restatement of Restitution section 110’s obstruction."70 But since
the contractor will always have a contract with the absent party who should
have paid, the assumption of risk and invasion of autonomy arguments will
always be present, producing as great an obstruction as the First
Restatement’s.
R3RUE Section 25 puts emphasis on the avoidance of a forced
exchange, and in its Illustration 12, based on Paschall’s, Inc. v. Dozier, it
of refurbishing).
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 1015. To be sure, Professor Rendleman was basing his conclusion on his
restating of the facts of Orleans Onyx in an extensive illustration that appears id. at 1011.
68. Cf. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION & UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 2(4) (2011)
("Liability in restitution may not subject an innocent recipient to a forced exchange: [I]n
other words, an obligation to pay for a benefit that the recipient should have been free to
refuse."). The Comment and Reporter’s Note to this subsection, however, discuss only
volunteers, and Orleans Onyx was neither a volunteer nor an intermeddler, given its contract
with Buchanan. Id. cmts. a–e.
69. See Rendleman, Onyx Bathroom, supra note 1, at 1013 ("The [First] Restatement
commentary does not supply intelligible reasons for this flat rule.").
70. Id. at 1014.

960

68 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 949 (2011)

justifies the court’s result by changing the facts to add that the daughter had
no regular income, that the owner and his wife were present at all times,
and that the improvement increased the appraised value of the house by
$15,000. These facts might be viewed as factors against finding a forced
exchange, but they aren’t in the Paschall’s case itself, and the court
imposed liability on the parents without these artificial assists away from
the forced exchange.71 In Orleans Onyx there is a very strong argument
about a forced exchange, an argument that seems more persuasive than the
assumption of risk by Orleans Onyx on which Professor Rendleman relies.
Admittedly, Brennan assumed the risk that his buyer would not be able to
complete the purchase of the house. He could easily have required
Buchanan to wait until he took title to commence his improvements.
Maybe this could count against the notion of a forced exchange, but just as
in Paschall’s and the North Dakota case involving the well,72 Brennan
ended up with an improvement that he didn’t want and wouldn’t have
agreed to, especially if he had to pay for it. Nonetheless, in both cases the
court found an unjust enrichment.
We believe that the most feasible way of dealing with this difficult
problem is to weigh the impact upon the contractor against both the benefit
to and the forced exchange imposed upon the ultimate user. Thus, unjust
impoverishment becomes part of the unjustness of the enrichment. In
Orleans Onyx II, Brennan is getting three new, if vulgar, bathrooms for
$5,000, while Orleans Onyx is being paid about three-fourths of its contract
price with Buchanan. If Buchanan had not made the first payment, that fact
might have justified a higher award against Brennan, since it would have
increased Orleans Onyx’s impoverishment, which wouldn’t have increased
Brennan’s enrichment, but it would have made it more unjust. On the other
hand, in that situation we could also ask why Orleans Onyx had taken so
big a risk with Buchanan, which would really be asking whether its
impoverishment was really that unjust, just as we ask why Brennan allowed
Buchanan to make the improvements before paying for the house. The
balance of both Orleans Onyx’s and Brennan’s risk-taking affects the
question of Brennan’s enrichment, not by increasing it, but by making it
more unjust. This comparison between benefit and impoverishment is not
71. The only relevant allegation is that "[s]aid materials and services were furnished
and performed in the construction of the addition heretofore mentioned with the Full
knowledge and consent of Defendants," and had enhanced the value of the property.
Paschall’s, 407 S.W.2d at 152.
72. See supra notes 30–42 and accompanying text (discussing Paschall’s and the
North Dakota case involving the well).
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completely different from the approaches of Professor Rendleman and the
R3RUE, but it focuses on relative fairness, and not on an abstract
discussion of the undermining of contract, forced exchange, and free will
jurisprudence.
B. The Public Costs of Legal Private Business: Of Cigarettes and Lead
Professor Rendleman also wrote about the more than $206 billion
settlement between various cigarette companies and almost all the states,
with his opinion made clear from the article’s subtitle: "Did the Smoke Get
in Their Eyes?"73 Rendleman focused on the original suit, brought by
Mississippi, but noted that almost all the states followed. A Minnesota
judge explained:
Six months after the Minnesota settlement agreement, 46 states and 6
U.S. territories also settled their lawsuits against the major tobacco
manufacturers by entering into the "Master Settlement Agreement."
Like the Minnesota settlement, the Master Settlement Agreement
requires the major tobacco manufacturers to make large settlement
payments over time, to make additional annual payments in perpetuity,
and to agree to certain restrictions on lobbying and advertising activities.
In exchange, each participating state agreed to release the participating
74
tobacco manufacturers from present and future claims.

Rendleman pointed out that the cigarette litigation had been
mischaracterized as a tort action, and analyzed it exhaustively, but with
considerable skepticism:
The law of restitution, as it has been developed and presently stands,
must be stretched and expanded before it will encompass the State’s
unjust enrichment-restitution argument. Settlement may have made
perfect political or business sense to the tobacco companies. But, in
light of the law on the tobacco companies’ side, settlement did not make
a lot of legal sense. They, however, may not have caught on.
Understanding neither the courthouse culture nor the substantive law,
the tobacco companies may have been "flummoxed" and "bamboozled"
on both levels.

73. Rendleman, Smoke, supra note 3, at 847.
74. Council of Indep. Tobacco Mfrs. v. State, 713 N.W.2d 300, 315 (Minn. 2006)
(Meyer, J., dissenting). The Master Settlement Agreement is 124 pages long. Collins v.
Chandler, 2002-CA-001985-MR WL 22149515, at *1 (Ky. Ct. App. Sept. 19, 2003).
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Rendleman’s rule: Don’t decide that because Southerners talk slower
75
than you do, they think slower too. That’s a big mistake.

To be sure, the effect of years of pending litigation on stock prices
may have affected the companies’ decisions to settle, but we are very
doubtful that a phalanx of high-priced lawyers, working for the most amoral
of tobacco executives, gave away more than two hundred billion dollars
because they were fooled by Forest Gump. While individual smokers had
universally been defeated by juries’ common sense feeling that they had
assumed the risk, those same jurors, or judges sitting without juries,76
would have focused on the impoverishment of their states’ treasuries, while
the tobacco companies made billions. There was no contract being
breached, no property right being trespassed upon, and no tort duty not to
sell a legal product widely known to be dangerous to health. But there was
a massive impoverishment, and as between the states and the companies
"the ties of natural justice and equity" argued for the cost to be met by those
who had benefitted. As the Rhode Island Superior Court said in a similar
suit, involving the lead industry:
Here, the Attorney General alleges that the State’s payment of Leadrelated costs has allowed and continues to allow the defendants to derive
economic gain from their promotion and sale of lead while, at the
State’s expense, avoiding responsibility for the damages it has caused.
Further, the State alleges that the defendants have appreciated the
benefit and that retention of the benefit is inequitable. In order for the
defendants to succeed on their motion to dismiss, they are required to
show that the State would not be entitled to relief under any of its
alleged facts. It is impossible for the Court to determine at this stage
that the State’s lead-related expenditures have not added to the
defendants’, including the LIA’s [Lead Industry Association’s],
advantage or saved them from loss. Accordingly, the States’ pleading is
77
sufficient with respect to its claim for unjust enrichment.

75. Rendleman, Smoke, supra note 3, at 930.
76. Professor Rendleman notes that the state had gone to great lengths to avoid a jury,
given the tobacco companies’ track record, Rendleman, Smoke, supra note 3, at 893–98, but
we wonder if juries would not have acted quite differently when it was their tax money that
the state had been forced to spend to care for those made ill by tobacco.
77. State v. Lead Indust. Ass’n, No. 99-5226, 2001 WL 345830, at *15 (R.I. Super. Ct.
Apr. 2, 2001). In 2008 the Rhode Island Supreme Court reversed findings that lead paint
was a public nuisance. See State v. Lead Indust. Ass’n, 951 A.2d 428, 435 (R.I. 2008). The
status of nationwide lead paint litigation is difficult to assess, since the various blogs
generally are tilted for or against the lead paint industry. It appears, however, that the
industry has done rather well. While the level of lead in children’s blood has declined
nationally, it is clear that lead paint remains a problem, particularly in poor neighborhoods.
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IV. Unjust Impoverishment Through Wrongful Foreclosure
We are all aware of the mortgage boom, the subprime mortgage
collapse and the foreclosure pandemic. In 2010, as the recession appeared
to be waning, it became widely known that lenders had ignored foreclosure
procedures and filed thousands of defective petitions. Among the abuses
disclosed were:
•

The bringing of actions as parties without establishing or
having standing. Proceedings commenced by servicers who
did not own the loan and frequently did not disclose the party
in interest or ever produce the Note.

•

The signing of hundreds of affidavits per day by "robo-signers"
who falsely swore that they had personal knowledge of the
accuracy of the information relied upon for foreclosure.

•

Homeowners being falsely assured that no foreclosure or sale
would take place and that a modification was in process by the
alleged lender. Then the homes were regularly sold by auction
to the same servicer making the empty promises during this
extended period that regularly extended multiple months if not
a year. Servicers would then increase profits by charging late
fees and other unearned junk fees for themselves or for
unnecessary services provided by subsidiaries making
foreclosure an avenue of fee revenue and a profit center for
servicers.

•

Holding a formerly delinquent borrower in default after she
brought the account current.

•

Failing to modify when the borrower was able to make
78
payments sufficient to avoid foreclosure. In light of a bargain

78. An opportunity to cure is an important part of modern contract remedies
jurisprudence, and failure to cure, if the opportunity is made available, is an essential
component of the materiality of a breach. See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
CONTRACTS §§ 237, 241; UCC 2-508, cmts. 2–4; E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS
§ 8.17 (4th ed. 2004); JOSEPH M. PERILLO, CALAMARI AND PERILLO ON CONTRACTS §§ 11.18,
11.20 (4th ed. 2003). Sixty years ago, Corbin wrote:
Care must, of course, be taken not to bring suit prematurely. If a minor breach
has occurred, but there is sufficient assurance that defects will be cured and
losses compensated, the bringing of suit at once may be properly regarded as
vexatious and an unreasonable enhancement of damages. Furthermore, if the
breach is minor it does not justify the injured party in refusing further
performance of his own and suing for damages as for a total breach. Such action
by him constitutes a total breach on his own part and puts him in the position of
a defendant rather than a plaintiff.
4 CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 948 (1951). In addition, state and federal statutes give homeowners
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for 360 payments, extending the term by two or so months
hardly puts the lender in a compromised position. Many of
these foreclosures are created by the servicers refusing
payments after the initial two or three months of hardship.
Where the borrower could resume the payments, they are often
refused or retained for fees in the foreclosure by recharacterizing the remittance as unapplied funds. Essentially,
the servicer, assumedly working in the best interest of the
investor, is forcing foreclosure by practices resulting in selfdealing profits at the expense of the investors.
•

The lenders who might take payments while looking into
modification or while a borrower is in bankruptcy failing to
"reset" the payment as current and then continuing to assess
fees which then accrue to the point it creates a deficiency that
the homeowner is unaware of or unable to catch up on. These
acts permit an improper foreclosure even when payments are
being remitted as agreed.

•

Promising to cancel a sale and other similar assurances that
borrowers relied upon in not seeking counsel, permitting the
financial institution to avoid the barrier of borrower
representation during the foreclosure process. The homes were
bid upon for the amount of the debt, not the appraised value, so
the servicer then retains the difference in equity without
79
returning overage proceeds to the homeowner.

For years the restitution concept focused on what one party gained.
Generally this was a consistent way to address the concept and differences
in results were negligible when looking from the other perspective. This
was a balanced equation, generally what one was enriched by, the other was
deprived of. The formula created an avenue for balance and equity that is
absent when reviewing the foreclosures.
It is absent due to the subject matter in perspective to the bargaining
power and relationship of the parties, now combined with the societal
aspects from taxpayer bailouts, to depletion of market value through
abandoned unsold properties and neighborhoods going to waste.
If these actions are found out early enough, the foreclosure can be
avoided, but often they go undiscovered or are not realized until after a
foreclosure and sale. Even if the homeowner has equity in the house, the
opportunities to cure and in some circumstances require modification.
79. Remember, although many properties are upside down in equity, others have
increased in value. Homeowners paid for a number of years, or put significant funds down
which are swallowed by the retained fees and sale windfall making foreclosure windfalls far
above the bargain and unjust enrichment.
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supposed mortgage holder typically bids only the outstanding balance on
the note. While the homeowners can theoretically take part in the auction,
in practice they rarely do, and few can raise the money. If they could, they
would redeem and begin repayment of the note.
Let us assume a house appraised at $150,000, with $100,000
remaining unpaid on the loan, and the homeowner is unable to make his
mortgage payments for a short period due to some unforeseen event. The
foreclosure takes place, the alleged mortgagee bids $100,000 and later
resells the house at a discount for $130,000. Assuming 10%80 for costs and
realtor fees, the lender receives a windfall of $17,000 while the homeowner
loses $50,000 in equity.
Consider too the actual impoverishment of the foreclosed homeowner.
Although impoverishment doesn’t need to be dramatic to apply, let’s look
at the tumbling effect. They lose their shelter, their emotional attachment to
their home, their initial investment in down payment, their equity, their
wealth-building vehicle, and become renters with the challenge of finding
housing since they have lost their credit rating. They increase expenses
relating to insurance and interest, they can be faced with deficiency
judgments, they can be strapped with mortgage insurers forcing repayment
agreements many times drafted to indicate they are nondischargeable and
spread over a decade. Now many of these borrowers are forced into
bankruptcy where the loss is shifted in part to other creditors. With these
effects of foreclosure, it will take years, if it can ever be accomplished, to
get back into a home as all these must be overcome in addition to saving
again and finding a creditor to take the risk after a foreclosure. Future risk
is present. The real holder of the note may also demand payment since
many of these notes were sold multiple times and the original was never
produced in the foreclosure process. Even if it has not yet appeared, since
the note is still in the market, there is a risk it will reappear at a later date.
The courts generally, without a demand for strict proof, sign off on
foreclosure by accepting production of a copy and the representation in the
pleading without question.
Society struggles with the concept because it is hard to believe or see
at first glance that the bank is enriched. However, it is easy to see how a
homeowner is impoverished. If the process was deficient or tainted, and in
80. Understanding these costs vary from state to state, a general figure was picked
which would include a real estate fee, upkeep costs, title and other closing costs. The reader
should remember that most REO (real estate owned departments) use a limited number of
realtors and a controlled list of service providers requiring that they provide services at
reduced costs and commissions.
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some cases, if it could have been avoided by a slight change in term such as
moving a few payments to the end and allowing the lender to continue to
amortize interest after a period of illness or layoff, then certainly the failure
to modify and the consequence of forfeiture is unjust. Equity abhors
forfeiture.
We looked at Onyx Bathroom where the contractor and homeowner
shared the assumption that the buyer would pay. In that case they both
shared in the loss under an assumption of the risk. When put on a balance,
is it justice and equity to allow the lender to retain these enrichments or
cause these impoverishments over a fraction of the costs? Perception in
foreclosure seems to be different: The lender’s risk assumption is forgotten
by people believing that those in foreclosure defaulted and that the lender is
the victim. However, this should be looked at as an equitable bargain and
exchange. Even if we are unwilling to consider a mortgage contract in less
than the strict reading of every word, when the foreclosure was tainted,
there is a strong argument for restitution, especially if combined with the
theories of tort, contract, and statutory consumer law.
There are many cases holding that compliance with HUD regulations
is a condition precedent to foreclosure despite the mortgagor’s failure to be
current on its payments.81 In addition, the Kansas Court of Appeals
recently held that a mortgagee’s failure to comply with contract terms not
only precluded its enforcement of the contract but could be a breach of the
duty of good faith and a breach of the mortgagee’s fiduciary duties entitling
the mortgagor to compensatory and punitive damages, affirming an award
of $1,593,997 in a commercial construction mortgage case.82 The Kansas
case could be a precedent for recovery of damages as well as an affirmative
defense when federal regulations are not followed before an attempted
foreclosure.
The foreclosure crisis may be moving towards results we saw in the
tobacco litigation, where society was paying the price and was ultimately
entitled to recovery. Under these theories the attorneys general have begun
settling with mortgage companies in large settlements regarding specific

81. See, e.g., Lacy-McKinney v. Taylor, Bean & Whitaker Mortg. Corp., 937 N.E.2d
853, 863 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010); Wells Fargo Home Mortg., Inc. v. Neal, 922 A.2d 538, 541
(Md. 2007); Cross v. Fed. Nat’l Mortg. Ass’n, 359 So. 2d 464, 464 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1978).
82. Bank of America, N.A. v. Narula, No. 102,853, 2011 WL 3209849 at *2 (Kan. Ct.
App., July 29, 2011).
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loan types. In October of 2010, the fifty attorneys general entered a joint
investigation into home foreclosures,83 popularly called "fraudclosures."
We suspect that there will be increased litigation by shareholders, and
investors seeking to recover these losses by repurchase and in breach of
duties as servicers. With respect to homeowners, we include in an appendix
a redacted demand letter raising many theories of damage recovery.84
V. In Conclusion
In our minds, the critical thing about restitution is the unjustness rather
than the enrichment. Whether an enrichment is unjust often depends on its
impact on the other party, that is, the extent to which the impoverishment
outweighs the enrichment. They are two sides to the same coin. We have
shown how mortgagees or their servicers have frequently violated
procedures and failed to comply with the laws regulating mortgages and
mortgage foreclosures. Homeowners impoverished by the wrongful or
disproportionate acts of lenders and their successors in interest should be
able to recover—in restitution and on related theories—for their
impoverishment.

83. Margaret Cronin Fisk, Attorneys General in 50 States Open Foreclosure Probe,
BLOOMBERG BUS. WK. (OCT. 13, 2010, 4:16 PM), http://www.businessweek.com/
news/2010-10-13/attorneys-general-in-50-states-open-foreclosure-probe.html (last visited
Oct. 12, 2011) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
84. See Appendix.
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Appendix A [to Linzer and Huffman, Unjust Impoverishment]

The following is a redacted and mildly altered version of a demand
letter sent by Ms. Huffman to the attorney for a mortgagee/servicer in a
pending foreclosure case. (Apparently, the underlying mortgage had been
sold to an "investor." The demand letter illustrates some of the possible
ways to get affirmative damages for homeowner-mortgagors, based on the
improper conduct of the foreclosing mortgage-holder or servicer.
Some background on the particular case: after initial problems with the
attorneys representing the mortgagee, the homeowners’ attorney had
contacted the office of the company’s president, and his office agreed that
payments would be accepted and the mortgage terms modified. However,
the functionaries at the mortgage company insisted that the homeowners
pay with money orders or cashier’s checks, even though that was not
required by the underlying agreement. Because the amount of the payment
was more than their bank’s limit on money orders, the homeowners sent
two money orders, totaling the amount of the payment, but their tender was
refused.
[Law Office Letterhead]
Re: C. and D. E., Mortgagors
Mr. A.B.,
Attorney for X Trust Co.
Dear Mr. B.:
As we previously discussed, I believe it is in our clients’ and the
investor’s mutual interest to settle this case. It would seem that based on
the bill submitted, both sides will increase the costs of litigation by
multiples but the Es have an opportunity to recoup theirs. As you are
aware, these types of cases are very discovery intensive. Although you and
I do not have discovery out together, I do have a Brown County case first
request at your office that you might review to get a feel of the initial
document request I will propound. You will see that it is considerable. I
feel strongly about this case and have assured my clients, the Es, that
should they be unable to continue to meet the litigation costs, I will engage
in alternative arrangements such as seeking some cost sharing or shifting on
expenses and/or a contingent fee agreement on damages; therefore, they
are assured that the financial burdens of litigation will not deprive them due
process. The future counterclaim defenses will not be chargeable to the Es,
since your client, X Trust, would be defendant and have a different duty
that was breached since it is a servicer rather than the owner of the
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mortgage note. Therefore, X Trust will not be able to recover those future
costs, which substantially reduces the downside for the Es. I think both
sides should go in understanding the risks and with our eyes open.
I refer you to the previously filed affidavits relating to the payment and
servicing of the loan. After X Trust and Mr. and Mrs. E agreed that the Es
would bring the account current, Mr. and Mrs. E remitted funds by money
orders. Because their bank limited the size of any given money order, Mr.
and Mrs. E sent two money orders totaling the amount of the payment,
together with a payment coupon showing the total amount. Your client
refused this payment, later explaining this action by saying, rather
unconvincingly, that it didn’t know how to apply the payments. The Es
thought they were current, because suspense money was to be applied to
their balance. Your client, however, applied the suspense money to other
advances. This explains the discrepancy in the records between the parties.
I have reviewed the Note and the Mortgage, as well as the payment
history you provided, and find no provision allowing X Trust to demand
money orders or cashier’s checks, no contractual obligation on the Es to do
so, and no problems with non-sufficient funds. X Trust’s unilateral change
in the terms of tender of payment contributed to the crossing of funds and X
Trust’s ultimate refusal to accept payments. In addition, it seems that X
Trust did not apply the funds in accordance with the agreement between the
parties when it utilized the suspense account that is in question here.
Your client faces counterclaims relating to its failure properly to
service the loan and its negligence in processing the modification. The
accounting shows deficiencies in the suspense account that support an
additional tort claim for conversion. In addition, your client deceptively
charged the Es for preparing and recording assignments of the Mortgage to
third parties as "statutory expenses" and "attorney’s fees." These appear to
be violations of the Truth In Lending Act (TILA) and the state Consumer
Protection Act. In addition, comparing the bills you have provided with the
statement given to the Es shows claims for "miscellaneous" expenses and
"statutory" expenses of $10.00, $125.00, $150.00 and a second $125.00,
when only one $125.00 fee appears on the provided bills. Each of the
unsupported claims constitutes a statutory false claim.
Your client deceptively represented to the Es that their home would
not be sold during the modification process but did not disclose the
presence of an investor whom you later claimed insisted on the sale to
avoid delays. (The delays the investor allegedly wanted to avoid were a
foreseeable consequence of X Trust’s negligence in losing documents,
failing to communicate and failing to adequately perform its duties.)
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Basic to the case is the representation of the Office of the President of
X Trust that the payments would be accepted and the loan modified. My
clients followed the instructions of your servicer, who repeatedly and
negligently lost documents and failed to make the promised modifications
in a proper and timely manner. This resulted in repeated and lengthy delays
that required my clients to keep creating and making monthly and quarterly
profit and loss statements, and later, at the insistence of X Trust, to have
them prepared by an accountant. Your client is certainly in a position to
know of these internal processing issues, as it has been subject to several
suits and claims and substantial judgments against it on these grounds, as
well as a recent consent order that covers the period of time in question and
outlines similar findings on the issues we will present.
This claim of breach of contract would lead to a suspension of the duty
to remit payments after your client refused them. Recent case law indicates
that if this claim is successful, my clients will not be liable for late charges
or interest during the period in question, an amount that you have calculated
at more than $20,000. But for X Trust’s failures and delays in accepting
and applying the Es’ payments and its subsequent refusals to modify the
loan after your President’s Office had agreed to do so, Mr. and Mrs. E
would not have incurred substantial attorney’s fees. These acts are
violations of the state Consumer Protection Act and under that Act, the Es
are entitled to recover their attorney’s fees. For each of the acts that we
prove, there is a statutory penalty of $10,000 under the applicable
regulatory law.
X Trust also led the Es to believe that X Trust was their lender when it
now claims that these actions were based on an "investor’s" decision. X
Trust failed to establish its standing at an earlier hearing and, while ordered
to produce the pooling and servicing agreement with the investor/owner,
has yet to do so.
[Ms. Huffman then went through a detailed examination of the
attorney’s fees claimed, stating that they were excessive when compared
with court records, finding charges for a case that X Trust had filed and
dismissed within three weeks, charges for several attorneys attending a
routine hearing, charges for a hearing that did not take place in the case at
hand, excessive time for preparation of standing arguments that appeared
routine given leading cases on the topic, charges for attorneys’ time in
improperly contacting the Es directly when they were represented by
counsel, and attorneys’ time in ending this practice.]
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In an effort to resolve all issues, the Es will settle all their claims for
the terms of the modification previously presented as 5% fixed, and
allowing for capitalization, reduced as detailed below.
In addition to the modification, X Trust must:
Remove the added $356.00 in unbilled foreclosure fees that were not
provided in the invoices.
Pay its own attorney’s fees and costs.
Contribute $5,000 towards the Es’ attorney’s fees and costs. (This is
only half of one state Consumer Protection Act claim; all of the attorney’s
fees will be recoverable if the Es prevail on any one of their TILA and state
Consumer Protection Act claims.)
Correct the Es’ credit report to reflect a dispute from April 2009
forward, so that the credit bureau will not report on the matter until the
modification takes place, showing the account as "current" by virtue of the
new agreement.
Make the modification "permanent" rather than "trial," to avoid future
disputes engendering further attorney’s fees.
There is no doubt that continued litigation will be costly and timeconsuming. With your client’s potential exposure, I feel that this is a very
good solution for everyone involved.
Sincerely yours,
***
[As of the time of publication, X Trust had not accepted the offer.
Future litigation will apparently be necessary and will show whether
lenders, including X Trust, should give this type of demand letter credence.]

